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THE DILEMMA OF REGULATING SMALL BUSINESS: THE
NEED FOR A NEW POLICY FRAMEWORK
DR. ROLAND G. DROITSCHt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE frequent concerns raised by small businesses that regula-
tions have a disproportionate impact on their operations are
often regarded by federal regulators as bothersome "political" or
"public relations" problems. These regulators see small busi-
nesses as a fringe group that appears politically well organized on
the general issues that affect its constituency. However, regula-
tors perceive specific regulations as having only a minimal nega-
tive impact on small businesses, which is outweighed by the
concerns raised by the broader constituent group at which such
regulations are directed.
The perception of many regulators that small-business con-
cerns need not be taken very seriously is reinforced by a number
of factors. First, the regulatory promulgation process itself is
complex and regulators tend to deal with large institutions or or-
ganizations. Comments on proposed regulations, letters, con-
gressional pressure and direct contacts are typically initiated by
larger institutions such as major corporations, trade organizations
and unions. Indeed, it is this type of organization that is able to
participate in the complex regulatory promulgation process and
understand how to influence the outcome of a specific rule. Dis-
cussions and frequent contact between such organizations and
regulators tend to confirm the "appropriateness" and "reasona-
bleness" of proposed rules, particularly once the concerns of
these larger entities have been met.
There are, of course, a number of organizations specifically
representing small business which often do participate in the
rulemaking process. However, the concerns such organizations
raise are typically of a generic nature, namely to exempt small
t The author is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Washington, D.C. In his capacity as Executive Director of the
Secretary's Policy Review Board, Dr. Droitsch reviews all regulations promul-
gated by the various regulatory agencies within the Department. The views ex-
pressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Department of Labor.
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business completely or to make some provision for "tiering" reg-
ulatory requirements.' Even such tiering recommendations are
often cast in general terms, such as calls for "less stringent" re-
quirements for small businesses, rather than specific changes in
proposed regulatory language that could be used by the regula-
tors to better tailor a standard to the needs of this group.2
A second factor which contributes to the discounting of
small-business concerns by regulators is the regulators' common
perception of the scope of the regulatory problem which they are
addressing. In so many cases, the regulatory problem is seen as
one emanating from large corporations. For example, large in-
dustrial concerns are seen as the major cause of pollution, illness,
injuries and corruption. Thus, in the eyes of regulators, it is to-
ward these organizations that standards are most appropriately
directed.
Finally, there is the difficult question of just what is a "small
business." It has been noted: "There is no law or regulation that
defines precisely what a small business is, which may be a reflec-
tion of the problem small businesses face as a group-everyone
supports them in principle, but not always in practice."3 Indeed,
a definition of a small business has been specified by the Small
Business Administration (SBA) through a rulemaking process.
This definition, however, takes up nearly fifty pages in the Code
of Federal Regulations. 4 It is so expansive that regulators quip
1. See Cohen, Small Business Is Getting a Big Reception in Washington, 24 NAT'LJ.
896, 896 (1977). Advocates of "tiering" argue that small business is different
from big business and thus that there should be a two-tier system of laws and
regulations. Id. The small business community makes two arguments in sup-
port of a two-tier system: (1) The administrative costs of regulation are a bur-
den which corporate giants can easily meet, but is one which could destroy
smaller companies; and (2) small businesses are at a competitive disadvantage
under an even-handed application of the laws and regulations. Id. For a discus-
sion of empirical studies demonstrating the disproportionate burden placed on
small businesses, see infra notes 38-42 and 44-46 and accompanying text.
2. But see Cohen, supra note 1, at 898. One area where tiering requests have
been specific is tax laws. See id. Small businesses have repeatedly requested dif-
ferent (lower) tax rates, different income reporting bases, simplified deprecia-
tion rules and capital gains roll-over provisions. See id.
3. Id. at 896.
4. See 13 C.F.R. § 121 (1988). The crux of the definition is that no "exact
quantitative procedure" exists to establish the standards that a business must
meet to qualify as a small business. Id. § 121.1(b). Size can be measured in
terms of employment, assets or receipts. See THE SMALL BuSINESs ADMIN., THE
STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 19-21 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter THE STATE OF SMALL BusINESS]. Specific size limits are defined for over 700
industries in the SBA regulations with varying standards in each industry. 13
C.F.R. § 121.2. Furthermore, different definitional standards may apply de-
972 [Vol. 33: p. 971
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that by using the SBA definition, every corporation except Gen-
eral Motors is a small business. Even the SBA is uncomfortable
with its official definition in the context of tailoring regulations. 5
Specifically, the SBA has urged the use of within-industry criteria
so that defining a business as small depends upon the particular
industry in which it operates. 6
Together the above factors tend to-diminish the importance
of small business in the eyes of regulators. Small businesses are
an undefined group, seemingly not related in any significant way
to the regulatory problem at hand. Their concerns are expressed
in general terms using the same message repeatedly. In short,
regulators see small business's concerns as not worthy of serious
consideration.
II. THE REGULATORY DILEMMA AND ITS RESOLUTION
A. How Important Are Small Businesses to Regulatory Compliance?
Notwithstanding the fact that larger industrial corporations
typically do present greater regulatory problems, federal regula-
tory agencies, if they are to be effective, must address the prob-
lem of regulating small businesses. The problem can best be
framed by the available data on firm size. In the tax year 1987, an
estimated 18.1 million business tax returns were filed. 7 Tax re-
turns were filed by 3.7 million corporations, 1.9 million partner-
ships and 12.6 million sole proprietorships. 8 Using the most
common definition that firms which employ 500 or more workers
pending upon the regulatory purpose. Id. § 121.1(d). For example, special
rules apply when a business is trying to invoke the special benefits applicable to
small businesses which buy or lease government property or which attempt to
procure a government contract. See id. §§ 121.5-121.6.
5. With the passage of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), the SBA
strongly urged agencies to adopt their own definition of what constitutes a small
business for purposes of a particular rule. Such urgings were consistent with the
legislative intent in passing the RFA, which was to encourage agencies to "utilize
innovative administrative procedures in dealing with ... small businesses." See
S. REP. No. 878, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2788, 2788. Specifically, the RFA encourages agencies to tailor
regulations to match the size of the small entities which it seeks to regulate by
imposing fewer, simpler requirements. Id. at 2798. For the text of the RFA, see
5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1982). For a discussion of the RFA, see infra notes 30-37
and accompanying text. For the text of the Small Business Act regulations defin-
ing what constitutes a small business, see 13 C.F.R. § 121 (1988).
6. See 13 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1988).
7. THE STATE OF SMALL BuSINESS, supra note 4, at 20-21 (1988).
8. Id.
1988] 973
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are large businesses, 9 all but 7000 of the 18.1 million businesses
would be classified as small.' 0 In terms of employment, overfifty
percent of American workers are employed in industries dominated
by small businesses.Il This compares to approximately thirty-six
percent of employment in industries dominated by large
businesses. 12
The importance of addressing the small-business sector is
further demonstrated by examining the target of many federal
regulations. The Department of Labor, for example, administers
approximately 140 statutes. Regulations derived from these stat-
utes fill hundreds of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations
and cover such diverse areas as the required wage rates of alien
workers, minimum wage requirements, child labor protections,
private pension security, vocational rehabilitation, apprenticeship
programs, the collection of data by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
overtime pay and occupational health and safety, to name a few.'5
A vast number of these regulations are directly applicable to small
businesses. If regulations cannot address the needs of this sector
of the economy, then it is highly doubtful that widespread compli-
ance with such regulations can be achieved.
A brief glance at other areas of federal regulation show a sim-
ilarly broad potential impact on small businesses. Environmental
regulations, tax regulations, trucking regulations and health-care
regulations, among many others, involve very significant numbers
of small businesses. In sum, the enormous size of the small-busi-
ness sector makes it imperative for federal regulators to effec-
tively communicate regulatory intent and compliance guidance if
their regulations are to be effective.
9. While more detailed breakdowns are also used, for most statistical pur-
poses, the SBA defines small businesses as those having either fewer than 500 or
fewer than 100 employees. Id. at 19 & n.12.
10. Id. at 20-21.
11. Id. at 13 (Table 3). Small-business-dominated industries are defined as
those in which 60% or more of the industry's employees work in firms with
fewer than 500 employees. Id.
12. Id. Large-business-dominated industries are defined as those in which
60% or more of the industry's employees work in firms with greater than 500
employees. Id. The remainder of industries (those in which small or large-busi-
ness employment shares fall between 40-60% of industry employment) are
deemed indeterminate industries and account for 10.1% of the work force. Id.
13. To get a fuller flavor of the broad scope of federal labor laws, most of
which are administered by the Department of Labor, see FEDERAL LABOR LAWS
app. at 529-918 (9th ed. 1988).
[Vol. 33: p. 971
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B. The Current Regulatory Setting
The question is often raised as to why federal regulations do
not meet the concerns of small business more effectively. The
issue has certainly received considerable attention from the legis-
lative and executive branches. Indeed, a number of major initia-
tives have been launched.' 4 Some answers to this question are
suggested by a review of the current rulemaking climate and eval-
uation of the administrative and legal framework in place today.
In many ways, the current climate can be traced to the sub-
stantial increase in regulatory activity in the 1960's and 1970's.
The sharp increase in regulatory activity from such newly-created
agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Pen-
sion and Welfare Benefit Administration (PWBA) and the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) resulted in a dra-
matic increase in the total regulatory burden imposed on busi-
nesses. In addition, individuals in favor of social regulation saw
the regulatory process as a means through which the reach of
these regulations could be extended beyond the original scope of
the regulatory statutes. 15 Individuals opposed to social regula-
tion saw many of these regulations as unnecessary, not cost-effec-
tive, overly complex and inflationary.
These latter concerns were heeded by the Ford, Carter and
Reagan Administrations, each of which initiated a series of regu-
latory reform efforts. 16 Two basic threads ran through these reg-
14. For a discussion of these initiatives, see infra notes 16-28 and accompa-
nying text.
15. See, e.g., W. NxSKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971) (developing general theory of bureaucratic supply of public services and
corresponding demand for bureau's output in environment of representative
government and suggesting changes in bureaucracy, sources of supply of public
services and political institutions); R. NOLL & B. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF DEREGULATION (1983) (developing theory of regulation as tool for well-or-
ganized interests often used for self-protection at expense of poorly-organized
interests for whom regulation was originally created to protect).
16. See Yandle, The Evolution of Regulatory Activities in the 1970s and 1980s in
ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, 1986: THE IMPACT OF THE REA-
GAN PROGRAM 105-45 (P. Cagen ed. 1986). The Ford Administration set the
foundation for future administrations by instituting regulation-review mecha-
nisms which focused on cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness determina-
tion and by considering alternative means of regulation. Id. at 118-19, 123. The
most notable of these mechanisms was a requirement that executive branch
agencies file economic impact statements for newly proposed rules. Id. Many
initiatives from the Ford era were continued and expanded by the Carter Admin-
istration. For example, economic impact statement requirements were broad-
ened. Id. at 119-20, 123. In addition, the Carter Administration attacked large
19881 975
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ulatory reform initiatives. First, there was the concern that
regulations were too burdensome, costly and unnecessary. Sec-
ond, there was the concern that small businesses bore a dispro-
portionate share of the regulatory burden.' 7 The policy
responses to both of these concerns contributed significantly to
establishing the current regulatory structure-and dilemma. Spe-
cifically, the regulatory promulgation process was transformed
from a process encouraged and minimally supervised by the exec-
utive branch to one which is discouraged and highly supervised.
The transformation has created a burdensome, highly litigious
struggle for both the proponents and opponents of regulation.
The response to the first concern-that regulations were too
burdensome, costly and unnecessary-was first addressed by the
Ford Administration's inflation impact statement program, which
was later formalized as the economic impact statement require-
ment.'8 This program required that an economic analysis be pre-
pared and published upon the final promulgation of a
regulation. 19 The Carter Administration subsequently increased
businesses through antitrust laws in an attempt to "deconcentrate" industries.
Id. The Reagan Administration refined and expanded the efforts of the earlier
administrations. More stringent and precise guidelines for review of regulations
have been developed and are applied under the supervision of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). Id. at 120-24. Additionally, all executive-
branch agencies must submit an annual statement to the Director of the OMB
containing a coherent description justifying all regulatory programs existing or
planned for that year. Id.
In effect, all three administrations have created an increasingly hostile envi-
ronment in which to pass regulations. Regulations are not subject to the influ-
ence of parties outside the agency, par,ticularly the OMB, which increases both
the difficulty in passing a regulation and the opportunity for organized special
interests to influence the process. Id.
17. For a discussion of the regulatory burden placed on small businesses
and proposals to alleviate it, see infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of empirical studies demonstrating the disproportionate burden
placed on small business, see infra notes 38-42 and 44-46 and accompanying
text.
18. See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975), reprinted in 12
U.S.C. § 1904 app. at 766 (Supp. V 1975) (Gerald R. Ford).
19. See Exec. Order No. 11,821. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 11,821
states: "Major proposals ... for the promulgation of regulations or rules by any
executive branch agency must be accompanied by a statement which certifies
that the inflationary impact of the proposal has been evaluated." Id. at § 1. This
order was the first step in forcing agencies to directly address the concerns of
the regulated community that regulations were too burdensome, costly and un-
necessary. The order mandated that the certification process consider:
a. cost on consumers, businesses, markets, or Federal, State or local
government;
b. effect on productivity of wage earners, business or government at
any level;
976
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these analytical requirements dramatically in Executive Order
12,044 requiring that a regulatory analysis 20 be prepared at the
time of the notice of proposed rulemaking for certain "signifi-
cant" regulations found to have "major economic conse-
quences." 21 These regulations were also subject to review by the
Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG) which was chaired by
the Council of Economic Advisors. 22 Both the regulatory analysis
and any comments submitted by the RARG became part of the
rulemaking record subject to judicial review. 23
c. effect on competition;
d. effect on supplies of important products or services.
Id. at § 3. For the background and an assessment of the Economic Impact State-
ment, see Miller, Lessons of the Economic Impact Statement Program, 1 REGULATION,
July/Aug. 1977, at 14-21.
20. A regulatory analysis is a formal document which has to be made avail-
able by the agency to the public. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 671
(1961-1981) (James Carter). In the analysis, the agency must explain the prob-
lem the proposed regulation is addressing, justify that the proposed regulation
is superior to other methods of addressing the problem and include an analysis
of the economic consequences of each method considered. Exec. Order No.
12,044 at § 3(b).
21. Id. at § 3. Executive Order No. 12,044 provided criteria for determin-
ing which regulations were significant. In identifying such regulations, an
agency would consider, inter alia: "(1) the type and number of individuals, busi-
nesses, organizations, State and local governments affected; (2) the compliance
and reporting requirements likely to be involved; (3) direct and indirect effects
of the regulation including the effect on competition; and (4) the relationship of
the regulations to those of other programs and agencies." Id. at § 2(e)(l)-(4).
However, an agency's conclusion that a regulation was significant did not auto-
matically mandate that a regulatory analysis be done for the regulation. See id. at
§ 3. Agency heads were then directed to establish and apply criteria mandating
regulatory analyses for all regulations which would (a) have an annual effect of
$100 million or more on the economy or (b) result in a major increase in costs or
prices for individual industries, levels of government or geographical regions.
Id. at § 3(a)(1). In addition, if the regulation did not meet these criteria, the
agency head still had authority to order'that a regulatory analysis be completed
on any proposed regulation. Id. at § 3(a)(2).
22. RARG was essentially responsible for overseeing the quality of regula-
tory analyses and usually submitted a formal public comment following publica-
tion of the proposed regulation in the Federal Register as part of the notice of
proposed rulemaking process. See Eads, Harnessing Regulation: The Evolving Role
of White House Oversight, 5 REGULATION, May-June 1981, at 19-26.
23. Id. The extent of such judicial review can be seen in the recent decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Building & Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO v. Brock in which the court ad-
dressed OSHA's asbestos standard. See 838 F.2d i258 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The
opinion went into considerable detail on the measurements of asbestos fibers
per cubic centimeter, significance of risk at various levels of exposure, the syner-
gistic effect of smoking, short-term exposure levels, technological feasibility and
random uncontrollable fluctuations. Id. This would seem to contradict the in-
tent of the Administrative Procedure Act to give regulatory agencies wide leeway
in regulatory decisionmaking provided that they have given appropriate notice
7
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The Reagan Administration, which had run on a platform of
regulatory reform, extended the analytical requirements for
rulemaking with its issuance of Executive Orders 12,29124 and
12,498.25 Review of regulations was now housed in the Executive
Office of the President, specifically, the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). The Director of the OMB was given substan-
tial power including the authority to return to agencies regula-
tions that failed to satisfy the review criteria set forth in the
Executive Orders. 26
The net result of these Executive Order requirements was to
sharply increase the analytical underpinnings of regulations.
While information provided by such analysis is laudable, these re-
quirements have greatly increased the time and resources needed
to promulgate regulations. Further, these requirements have
opened major new avenues for judicial review. The detailed anal-
ysis provided in a regulatory impact analysis has become grist for
both the opponents and proponents of regulations such that the
"informal rulemaking" process, established by the Administrative
Procedure Act,27 has become encrusted with executive and judi-
and comment. For the text of the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C.
§§ 500-576 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
24. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 431-34 (1982) (Ronald Reagan). This order expanded the definition of a
significant rule to include any rule with major adverse effects on competition,
employment, investment, productivity, innovation or American competition with
foreign markets. See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § I(b)(3). Two other major effects
of this order were the requirement that a cost-benefit test be applied and the
installation of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as overseer of the
regulatory process. See id. §§ 3(d), 6. The OMB was given substantially more
power than RARG, its predecessor under the Carter Administration. See Eads,
supra note 22, at 19-2 1. For a discussion of the criteria used to define significant
regulations prior to Executive Order 12, 291, see supra note 21 and accompany-
ing text.
25. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 107-08 (Supp. IV 1986) (Ronald Reagan). This order sought to further
coordinate the regulatory process by increasing "the accountability of agency
heads . . . provid[ing] for Presidential oversight of the regulatory process ...
[and] minimiz[ing] duplication and conflict of regulations." Id. The main provi-
sion of this order required each agency to file an annual statement of "its regula-
tory policies, goals, and objectives." Id. § 1(a).
26. In evaluating regulations, the Director of OMB was to consider whether
the proposed regulations were consistent with the administration's policies and
the regulations of other agencies. See id.; see also OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, INTERIM REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS GUIDANCE, reprinted in FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 22-35 (Office of the Chairman 1985)
(setting forth five criteria required to be addressed by regulatory impact
analysis).
27. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 & 701-706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
978
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cial branch review requirements. The promulgation of a regula-
tion, in short, has become a very major undertaking.
The impact of these analytic requirements, while generally
improving the quality of regulations, particularly for those organ-
ized interests able to pursue remedies under this costly process,
has created substantial difficulties for small businesses. The mere
complexity of the rulemaking process itself now excludes many
from effectively participating in the development of rules. The
impact of a regulation is discussed in highly technical, legal and
economic terms such as the discounted streams of future costs
and benefits, sensitivity analysis and monetization of benefits.
Total costs and benefits are arrayed in terms of a societal frame-
work rather than in terms understandable to the specific sub-
groups affected by a regulation. Much of the language in a
regulation and its preamble are written with judicial review in
mind rather than for the purpose of conveying the simple, clear
meaning of the regulation. The cry for regulatory reform has
elicited a bureaucratic response-more paper, more "analysis"
and more review in each branch of the government.
To make matters more difficult, compliance with any particu-
lar regulation, once promulgated, is an increasingly complex task.
For example, simply reading the recently published OSHA for-
maldehyde standard provides relatively little guidance as to how a
firm should comply.2 8 Understanding this standard, which has a
considerable impact on a broad spectrum of small businesses re-
quires a careful reading of the preamble which in itself is a 500-
page document. Such vital preamble language, however, is not
published in the Code of Federal Regulations. Thus, those wish-
ing to understand the intent of the specific regulatory language in
the standard must locate the preamble language in the Federal
Register of the day on which the final regulation was originally
published.
Finally, the preamble language, in conjunction with the rule,
still does not provide complete guidance as to how a firm should
comply with a regulation. Agency "guidance" and "interpreta-
tions" in addition to rulings from Administrative LawJudges and,
from time to time, the federal courts, embellish the original inter-
pretations of a regulation so that a full understanding is often not
possible without considerable research.
28. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,168
(1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048).
1988] 979
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C. The Regulatory Flexibility Act
Paralleling the concerns raised by the dramatic increase in
regulatory activity in the 1960's and 1970's over costly and un-
necessary regulations was the concern about the differential im-
pact of regulations on small business. Reports prepared by the
Senate Select Committee on Small Business in the late 1970's
contained numerous examples of the problems faced by small
businesses due to the disproportionate impact of regulations on
such entities. 29 In 1977, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 30 (RFA)
was introduced and required agencies to identify and discuss reg-
ulatory alternatives which would meet the stated objectives of ap-
plicable statutes and minimize unnecessary burdens on "small
entities." The Committee on the Judiciary's Report on the RFA
stated the need for flexible regulations:
When the government chooses to act through regu-
lation by defining acceptable conduct through adminis-
trative rules, it faces squarely a basic tension in the law:
the inescapable conflict between uniformity and diver-
sity, between rule and discretion, and between the
"rough justice" of broad categories and justice tailored
to the equities of individual situations.
Today, it is quite clear that government agencies
nearly always choose the former of each of those alterna-
tives. Regulations tend to be uniform in design, permit
little discretion in their implementation, and implicitly
assume that all those subject to them are basically
alike.3'
Enacted in 1980, the outstanding requirement of the RFA
was that agencies perform "regulatory flexibility analyses" as part
of the rulemaking process.3 2 Specifically, such analyses were re-
quired for those regulations deemed to have a "significant eco-
nomic impact on a substantial number of small entities." 33 In
29. S. REP. No. 878, supra note 5, at 2790 (citation omitted).
30. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1982).
31. S. REP. No. 878, supra note 5, at 2790.
32. See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (1982). The RFA requires an agency to prepare
both an initial regulatory flexibility analysis which it publishes along with the
proposed rule and a final regulatory flexibility analysis which accompanies the
final rule and a statement of basis and purpose. Id.
33. Id. § 605(b). The RFA failed to define what is meant by "significant
economic impact." This failure was intentional as the Senate believed a clear
10
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those cases where there was no significant economic impact, the
agency head was required to certify that finding in writing to the
newly created Chief Counsel for Advocacy within the Small Busi-
ness Administration. The Chief Counsel was to monitor and re-
port to the President and Congress federal agency compliance
with the RFA. s4
Introduced with considerable fanfare, the RFA has been dis-
appointing in that it has not significantly changed federal agency
behavior in regulating small businesses. While the Office for Ad-
vocacy has been able to intercede in a number of regulations to
improve their acceptability to small businesses, limited staff and
the absence of any direct enforcement mechanism requiring
agencies to perform adequate analyses has frustrated the goal of
the RFA. In addition, section 611(b) of the RFA provides that
agency compliance not be subject to judicial review, but also that
regulatory flexibility analyses shall be considered as part of the
overall record for the purpose of such review.35
The practice under the RFA, for the vast number of regula-
tions, has been for agencies to certify to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy that the regulations do not have a substantial impact on
small entities. Courts have reached conclusions consistent with
that expressed in Thompson v. Clark 3 6 in which the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
while a regulatory flexibility analysis is part of the overall
rulemaking record, agency certification that no such analysis is re-
quired is not subject to judicial review.37
Even in those cases where a flexibility analysis was per-
definition would be counterproductive. See Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regula-
toy Flexibility Act, 1982 DuKE L.J. 213, 242-43 (citing 126 CONG. REC. S10,943
(daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980)).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 609(3) (1982). For a comprehensive discussion of the RFA,
see Verkuil, supra note 33.
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 611 (b) (1982); THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN., ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL FOR ADVOCACY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULA-
TORY FLEXIBILITY ACT 10 (Apr. 1987).
36. 741 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
37. See id. at 405; see also Lehigh Valley Farmers v. Block, 640 F. Supp. 1497,
1519-20 & n.20 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing 126 CONG. REC. 21,460-61 (1980))
(notwithstanding contradictory statements by Senator Culver in legislative his-
tory, court agreed with Thompson court and concluded that proposed rule will
not have significant economic impact on substantial number of small entities and
is not subject to judicial review), aff'd, 829 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1987); Mast Indus.
v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567, 1573 n.9 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (dicta that "compli-
ance or noncompliance of agencies with the [RFA] and Executive Order 12,291
is specifically precluded from judicial review").
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formed, with a limited number of exceptions, few dramatic
changes have been adopted in the regulation itself. Typically,
such changes have involved reduced paperwork requirements,
modest exemptions from certain provisions of a rule, reduced
training requirements and scaled user fees. In the final analysis,
small businesses must comply with essentially the same provisions
in newly promulgated regulations that are required of large
companies.
D. Economic Impact of Regulations on Small Businesses
At the time of the enactment of the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, there was little empirical evidence that small businesses bore
a disproportionate share of the regulatory burden. While little
direct evidence was available at that time, there were well-known
reasons why one should expect such disproportionate burdens a
priori. Specifically, larger businesses can spread the administra-
tive costs of complying with regulations over larger sales volumes
than smaller businesses can. Also, there are economies of scale in
legal costs. Finally, in the case of capital equipment require-
ments, larger businesses typically can average such costs over a
larger quantity of production.
There are now a number of empirical studies such as those
by Booz-Allen and Hamilton,38 B. Peter Pashigian,3 9 Arthur An-
dersen 40 and Cole and Sommers4 1 which demonstrate such differ-
ential impacts. The most recent and most comprehensive study
was prepared by Jack Faucett Associates entitled Economies of Scale
in Regulatory Compliance: Evidence of the Differential Impacts of Regula-
tion by Size of Firm.42 This study examined fourteen major regula-
38. BOoz-ALLEN & HAMILTON, IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON
SMALL BUSINESS (1982) (regulations create entry barriers, restrict competition
and support monopoly power).
39. Pashigian, The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and
Factor Shares, 27 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1984). For a summary version of this article, see
Pashigian, How Large and Small Plants Fare Under Environmental Regulation, 7 REGU-
LATION, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 19-24 (environmental regulation affects small indus-
trial plants more adversely than large plants, mostly through greater allocation
of funds to capital compared to labor).
40. ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY COSTS ON ESTAB-
LISHMENT SIZE FOR THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (1979) (demonstrating
differential economic impact of regulations on small businesses).
41. R. COLE & P. SOMMERS, COMPLYING WITH GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS:
THE COSTS TO SMALL AND LARGER BUSINESSES (1981) (final report to SBA) (dem-
onstrating that disproportionate burden on small businesses varies across
industries).
42. JACK FAUCETF Assoc., ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN REGULATORY COMPLI-
982 [Vol. 33: p. 971
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tions which were paired with four-digit Standard Industrial
Classification 43 (SIC) industry sectors affected by the respective
regulations. By analyzing those regulation-industry pairs, the
study concluded that the relative burden of regulation is substan-
tially greater for small firms than for large firms. 44
Using nonparametric scaling factors, the Faucett study found
that the total regulatory compliance cost per employee at the mid-
size firms was 1.35 times higher than that of the large firms. 45
The total regulatory compliance costs per employee for small
firms was estimated at 2.83 times that of large firms.46 In sum,
the results of the Faucett study constitute strong evidence of the
disproportionate burden placed on small businesses by federal
regulations.
However, these studies underestimate the severity of the
problem since they attempt to estimate the actual differential costs
incurred, whereas, most studies examine the differential cost that
would be incurred were there full compliance with a set of regulations.
The problem, for example, can be seen in the Faucett study which
used agency regulatory impact analyses for cost data rather than
actual cost estimates. There is considerable evidence, however,
that many small businesses (and some large businesses) respond
to regulations by not fully complying or simply not complying.
Whether or not such compliance is forthcoming in the case of any
particular regulation is, of course, dependent upon a number of
factors. The newness of the regulation, its complexity, the rela-
tive costs of compliance and the degree of agency enforcement
contribute to the degree of compliance achieved. For example,
the federal minimum wage standard 47 currently has a relatively
high degree of compliance as it is generally well understood,
widely publicized and relatively unburdensome. By comparison,
a new OSHA regulation, such as the hazard communication stan-
dard48 which has relatively complex provisions, would probably
ANCE: EVIDENCE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS OF REGULATION BY FIRM SIZE
(1984) (final report to SBA Office of Advocacy).
43. For an explanation of the SIC coding system, see EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL (1987). The SIC
codes were established "for purposes of facilitating the collection, tabulation,
presentation, and analysis of data.., and for promoting uniformity and compa-
rability in the presentation of statistical data." Id. at 11.
44. JACK FAUCETT Assoc., supra note 42, at i.
45. Id. at xv.
46. Id.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987).
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reveal relatively poor compliance, especially since compliance in-
spections occur very infrequently for the typical firm. It is, of
course, in the latter category that a substantial number of the
newer social regulatory actions fall.
E. The Dilemma Facing the Regulators of Small Businesses
The dilemma of achieving broad compliance in the face of
increasingly complex regulatory promulgation requirements
poses significant problems for the regulating agency. On the one
hand, the regulatory process is already overly complex, costly and
time consuming. To tailor regulations carefully to the needs of
small business under this process would almost require separate
rulemakings. Extraordinary effort would be needed to signifi-
cantly meet the regulatory concerns of small business. On the
other hand, small businesses constitute such a large share of the
economy and employment that significant regulatory compliance
by this group is necessary if an acceptable level of compliance is
to be achieved.
The regulator and regulated communities appear to be
locked into a system that is not beneficial to either party. For the
regulator seeking to achieve compliance with a regulation, or
more fundamentally, to change behavior, the current structure re-
quires extraordinarily lengthy and complex procedures. Compli-
ance with Administrative Procedure Act requirements, regulatory
impact analyses, regulatory flexibility analyses, paperwork reduc-
tion filings, environmental impact analyses and other administra-
tive requirements are just the initial stages of rulemaking. The
lengthy review processes within agencies and subsequently at the
Office of Management and Budget are then often followed by
legal challenges which extend the promulgation process even fur-
ther. These requirements are so difficult to meet that in the case
of OSHA, the agency has been able to promulgate only nineteen
section 6(b) health standards since it was established. 49 The aver-
age regulatory impact analysis costs the agency a quarter of a mil-
lion dollars. For larger standards, these costs have been
considerably higher. The regulatory problem for OSHA is placed
in perspective when one compares the number of health stan-
49. See Oversight Hearings on the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)
(statement of Michael E. Baroody, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Policy) (avail-
able from Department of Labor).
[Vol. 33: p. 971
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dards actually issued with the estimated one-half million hazard-
ous substances in the workplace.
The regulating community, notwithstanding regulatory anal-
yses and regulatory flexibility analyses, has failed in its goal of
achieving simple, flexible and cost-effective regulations. The
tools intended to achieve the end-administrative procedures,
various analyses, executive branch and judicial reviews-simply
have produced an overwhelmingly complex and litigious process.
Only the largest of companies with very substantial resources for
direct intervention into the process itself generally understand
the development and promulgation of a regulation. 50 This leaves
the vast majority of regulated firms unable to participate effec-
tively and to influence such rulemakings.
F. Toward Resolution of the Dilemma
Just as it is the regulators' goal to change the behavior of
those whom they are regulating, regulators themselves must un-
dergo a change in behavior to achieve effective compliance. The
promulgation of a regulation by itself does not achieve such com-
pliance. Compliance is a function of a number of factors includ-
ing the ease with which one who is willing to comply is able and
compelled to comply with a regulation. 5' Since, in practice, en-
forcement activity is severely constrained by resource factors,
most compliance must be achieved essentially through voluntary
compliance. Rules which are perceived as too complex, overly
burdensome and unfair obviously will meet with resistance from
the regulated community and be ignored.
The rulemaking process described above simply does not
provide the mechanism for meaningful input from the substantial
small business sector of the economy. The regulatory flexibility
analysis requirement, intended to sensitize the regulating com-
munity to the needs of small business, is seen as a burdensome
requirement thrust upon the regulators. The notice and com-
ment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act, for all
practical purposes, are not an available avenue for most small
businesses to address their concerns. The argument that small
businesses are represented effectively in the rulemaking process
50. For an interesting insight into the complexity of the regulatory process
and how to operate effectively in this arena, see DeLong, How to Convince an
Agency: A Handbook for Policy Advocates, 6 REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 27-36.
51. For a most thoughtful statement on compliance, see Dunlop, The Limits
of Legal Compulsion, 27 LAB. L.J. 67 (1976).
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through trade organizations and specific associations has not
been demonstrated when it comes to specific regulatory actions.
While it is clear that such organizations do represent small busi-
nesses' interests to some degree, it remains obvious that there is a
long way to go before a substantial number of regulations will be
tailored to the needs of this constituency.
The following list of actions suggest the types of changes fed-
eral regulators must make if they are to truly alter the structure of
their regulations to meet the needs of small entities:
1. Agencies must carefully establish priority sys-
tems for promulgating regulations. The volume of fed-
eral regulations is overwhelming. With so many
requirements, there is little else for the small business to
do other than to ignore many regulations.
2. In many cases, rules must be developed with
small businesses primarily in mind. This means very
careful wording of regulations, preferably with the direct
input and assistance of small businesses. Regulators,
thus, should seek the advice of small businesses through
advisory committees, negotiated rulemaking techniques
and other similar channels. Passive acceptance of meet-
ing small business concerns through the notice and com-
ment process is not sufficient.
3. The federal government should provide direct
compliance assistance to small businesses in implement-
ing regulations. In the case of OSHA regulations, the
federal government, which is required to comply with
such standards itself, should be used as a testing ground
in which the regulations would be implemented with the
guidance and training materials made available to the
general public. Adaptation of implementing procedures,
handbooks, training films, tool kits and other media
should be prepared for use by small businesses and
widely distributed at minimal cost.
4. Agencies should issue fewer specification stan-
dards in favor of performance-oriented regulations. The
frequent complaint that performance-oriented regula-
tions are difficult to comply with should be dealt with by
including nonmandatory compliance "guidance." Such
information would be especially helpful if there were
986 [Vol. 33: p. 971
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separately directed guidance aimed at large, medium
and small entities.
5. Agencies should carefully monitor the imple-
mentation of regulations and listen to complaints and
problems surrounding compliance. Compliance assist-
ance should be revised regularly to address such
complaints.
6. Agencies should take advantage of new informa-
tion-dissemination techniques to help small businesses
comply with regulations. For example, with laser disks,
tremendous amounts of information can be compactly
stored on a single disk. Such disks could carry substan-
tial information about a very large number of regulations
including compliance guidance to small businesses. The
information could be organized across regulations thus
providing the user with a checklist approach specifying
the basic federal requirements for general areas such as
environmental control, health and safety and benefits.
Information that is readily available and formatted in a
user-friendly mode would encourage compliance by
small businesses.
III. CONCLUSION
It is increasingly clear that small businesses-however de-
fined-represent a substantial sector of the regulated community.
Failure to reach this large group and to change its behavior essen-
tially guarantees the failure of a regulatory agency to achieve
broad compliance with its regulations. Reforms in the regulatory
promulgation process, and specifically those designed to remedy
the problems associated with regulating small businesses, have
not effectively addressed this problem. Those reforms, and
others intended to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of
regulations, have substantially added to the burdens and delays in
promulgating regulations. Further, they have instituted a process
that is not easily accessible to small businesses because of its com-
plexity and the costs of intervention. Evidence is mounting that
the costs of new regulations are indeed disproportionately falling
on small businesses. This has led to regulatory inequities or sim-
ple noncompliance. It is in the interests of both the regulators
and the regulated to rethink the current regulatory structure.
This can be achieved within the current statutory framework;
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however, it does require a fundamental behavioral change in how
agencies approach the regulatory promulgation process with re-
spect to small business.
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